A note on van Damme's mechanism
We consider (two-person) bargaining games and we assume that the agents want to apply two possibly different bargaining solutions. A mechanism is a function which assigns an allocation to every bargaining game and every pair of bargaining solutions. Examining van Damme's mechanism (1986) from a cooperative point of view we see that it fails to satisfy Pareto-optimality. By modifying it we propose a new mechanism yielding the same conclusions as the original while enjoying some additional desirable properties.
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Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 8 August 1998 / Accepted: 15 October 1998|
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