The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility
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- Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1999.
"Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-228, May.
- Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Game Theory and Information 9705003, EconWPA.
- Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field," Economics Working Papers 241, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Sergiu Hart, 2004.
"A comparison of non-transferable utility values,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 35-46, April.
- Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996.
"Bargaining and Value,"
Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
- Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
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