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Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Form Games

  • Sergiu Hart
  • Andreu Mas-Colell

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000002205.

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Date of creation: 09 Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002205
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  1. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier.
  2. Sergiu Hart, 2004. "A comparison of non-transferable utility values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(2_2), pages 35-46, 02.
  3. Serrano, Roberto & Clippel, Geoffroy de, 2005. "Marginal contributions and externalities in the value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057339, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Herbert E. Scarf, 1970. "On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a General Class of N-Person Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 293, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Hart, Sergiu, 2002. "Values of perfectly competitive economies," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 57, pages 2169-2184 Elsevier.
  7. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
  8. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
  9. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  10. Hart, S. & Mas-Colell, A., 1993. "Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Non Equivalence to Competitive Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 9, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  11. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  12. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2007. "Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 339-356, July.
  13. Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
  14. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  15. Sergiu Hart, 2005. "An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 355-366, 09.
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