"My friends: it would be an error to accept": Communication and group identity in a bargaining setting
In this paper we introduce communication into intergroup ultimatum bargaining in a lab. The responder groups vote whether to accept the proposals with unanimity required either for acceptance or for rejection. In contrast with the no-communication results reported in our previous study (Elbittar, Gomberg and Sour 2011), the group decision rule does affect the individual voting behavior when subjects are allowed to exchange messages before voting. In fact, when acceptance is the default, subjects become substantially more likely to vote to reject an offer. As a result, the formal group decision-making rule turns out to have little impact on group decisions, which follow the behavior of the more confronational subjects, as predicted by the "group discontinuity hypothesis" of the psychological literature.
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- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
- Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
- Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2005.
"Alliances and negotiations,"
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Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 128-141, March.
- Paola MAnzini & Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Alliances and Negotiations," Game Theory and Information 0004007, EconWPA.
- Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Alliances and Negotiations," Working Papers 424, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Laura Sour, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000267, David K. Levine.
- Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Laura Sour, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0407, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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