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Government policy and the probability of coordination failures

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  • Ennis, Huberto M.
  • Keister, Todd

Abstract

This paper introduces an approach to the study of optimal government policy in economies characterized by a coordination problem and multiple equilibria. Such models are often criticized as not being useful for policy analysis because they fail to assign a unique prediction to each possible policy choice. We employ a selection mechanism that assigns, ex ante, a probability to each equilibrium indicating how likely it is to obtain. We show how such a mechanism can be derived as the natural result of an adaptive learning process. This approach leads to a well-defined optimal policy problem, and has important implications for the conduct of government policy. We illustrate these implications using a simple model of technology adoption under network externalities.
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  • Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Government policy and the probability of coordination failures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 939-973, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:4:p:939-973
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    Cited by:

    1. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2009. "Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1588-1607, September.
    2. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2003. "Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 220-245, April.
    3. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2006. "Bank runs and investment decisions revisited," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 217-232, March.
    4. Giese, Julia & Nelson, Benjamin & Tanaka, Misa & Tarashev, Nikola, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 21: How could macroprudential policy affect financial system resilience and credit? Lessons from the literature," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 21, Bank of England.
    5. Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2004. "Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1513-1553.
    6. Huberto M. Ennis, 2003. "Economic fundamentals and bank runs," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 55-71.
    7. Marco Bassetto & Christopher Phelan, 2008. "Tax Riots," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 649-669.
    8. Todd Keister, 2009. "Expectations And Contagion In Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 991-1012, August.
    9. Sanchez Villalba, Miguel, 2015. "Global inspection games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 59-72.
    10. Huberto M. Ennis, 2005. "Complementariedades y Política Macroeconómica," Department of Economics, Working Papers 054, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    11. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Optimal fiscal policy under multiple equilibria," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1359-1377, November.
    12. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2003. "Aggregate demand management with multiple equilibria," Working Paper 03-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    13. Fecht, Falko & Eder, Armin & Pausch, Thilo, 2013. "Banks, Markets, and Financial Stability," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79712, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. King, Robert G. & Wolman, Alexander L., 2004. "Monetary discretion, pricing complementarity and dynamic multiple equilibria," Working Paper Series 343, European Central Bank.

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