IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Evolution in Teams

  • David P. Myatt
  • Chris Wallace

Team formation will often involve a coordination problem. If no-one else is contributing to a team, there is little point in an agent exerting any effort. Similarly, once a team is formed, an agent within the team will not leave, as to do so would result in team collapse; non-contributing agents would not join, as they currently receive the benefits of the team`s efforts whilst paying none of the costs. The methods of the stochastic adjustment dynamics literature can help select between these equilibria. Team and population size, and cost and benefit parameters all play a role in determining the chances of successful team formation. Increasing the pool of agents from which to choose team members seems at first glance to have a positive impact upon team formation. However, just one bad apple within the extended pool can have a disproportionate effect on the outcome. Although an agent with high participation costs would never contribute to a successful team, their mere presence alone can result in the failure of an otherwise successful team.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper177.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 177.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:177
Contact details of provider: Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. David P. Myatt & Hyun Song Shin & Chris Wallace, 2002. "The Assessment: Games and Coordination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 397-417.
  2. Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, . "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b, Penn Economics Department.
  3. Ley, E., 1993. "On the Private Provision of Public Goods: A Diagrammatic Exposition," Papers 93-27, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  5. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  6. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  7. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2002. "Equilibrium Selection and Public Good Provision," Economics Series Working Papers 103, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  10. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2002. "Equilibrium Selection and Public-good Provision: The Development of Open-source Software," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 446-461.
  11. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:177. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise)

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Caroline Wise to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.