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Complementariedades y Política Macroeconómica

  • Huberto M. Ennis

Este trabajo discute algunos desarrollos teóricos recientes sobre la determinación de la política macroeconómica óptima en situaciones en las que existen complementariedades estratégicas entre los agentes de la economía. Se presentan las ideas utilizando como base un modelo simple que permite capturar con simpleza los aspectos fundamentales involucrados en la discusión. En el modelo, los agentes deciden si participar, o no, en actividades de mercado y el beneficio de participar esta asociado con la decisión de participación del resto de los agentes. Se demuestra la presencia de equilibrios múltiples y se construyen equilibrios sunspot. Se discute la política macroeconómica óptima en tales situaciones y el rol de la estructura de información en la determinación de las propiedades de los equilibrios. Finalmente, se ilustra la posibilidad de que se produzcan avalanchas anticipadas de (no) participación, donde la diseminación limitada de la información juega un rol fundamental.

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Paper provided by Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata in its series Department of Economics, Working Papers with number 054.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lap:wpaper:054
Contact details of provider: Postal: Calle 48 No555 - La Plata (1900)
Phone: 21- 1466
Fax: 54-21-25-9536
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  1. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 1996. "Endogenous public policy and multiple equilibria," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 653-662, April.
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  4. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2003. "Government Policy and the Probability of Coordination Failures," Working Papers 0301, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
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  9. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2003. "Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 220-245, April.
  10. Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, 2005. "Coordination Failures, Clusters and Microeconomic Interventions," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6829, Inter-American Development Bank.
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  14. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
  15. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Optimal fiscal policy under multiple equilibria," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1359-1377, November.
  16. Robert G. King, 2006. "Discretionary policy and multiple equilibria," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 1-15.
  17. Bassetto, Marco, 2005. "Equilibrium and government commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 79-105, September.
  18. Vives, Xavier, 2004. "Complementarities and Games: New Developments," CEPR Discussion Papers 4742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans," Staff Report 122, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  20. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578967.
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