IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cvs/starer/98-10.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fallback Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Brams, S.J.
  • Kilgour, D.M.

Abstract

Fallback bargaining is a bargaining procedure under which bargainers begin by indicating their preference rankings over all alternatives. They then fall back, in lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives - starting with first choices, then adding second choices, and so on - until an alternative is found on which all bargainers agree. This common agreement, which becomes the outcome of the procedure, may be different if a decision rule other than unanimity is used.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1998. "Fallback Bargaining," Working Papers 98-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-10
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard F. Potthoff & Steven J. Brams, 1998. "Proportional Representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 147-178, April.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
    4. Steven J. Brams & Ann E. Doherty, 1993. "Intransigence in Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 692-708, December.
    5. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    7. Brams,Steven J. & Taylor,Alan D., 1996. "Fair Division," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521556446, August.
    8. Leonid Hurwicz, 1996. "Institutions As Families Of Game Forms," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 113-132, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2017. "The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: Experimental evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Ronan Congar & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 131-147, January.
    3. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2012. "Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
    4. repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9412-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Aleksei Yu. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2018. "Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach," HSE Working papers WP BRP 194/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. repec:spr:grdene:v:19:y:2010:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-008-9121-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour, 2005. "Forming stable coalitions: The process matters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 67-94, July.
    8. repec:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-010-9226-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:spr:grdene:v:13:y:2004:i:4:d:10.1023_b:grup.0000042925.01972.ad is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:spr:grdene:v:23:y:2014:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-013-9345-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-010-9195-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2017. "The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: Experimental evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    13. John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 2012. "The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 23-42, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    BARGAINING ; SOCIAL CHOICE ; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

    JEL classification:

    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Stubing). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aenyuus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.