Protectionist demands in globalization
This paper analyzes a small, open economy whose citizens have single-peaked preferences on the tariff rate for an import good. They publicly declare this rate to the government, which has discretion in implementing it. While the government has an incentive not to deviate too much from the publicly chosen tariff rate, its final choice is determined by bargaining with a foreign lobby that has a much lower optimal rate and offers monetary transfers in return for lower tariffs. The authors show that the expectation of foreign influence causes citizens to vote for a more protectionist tariff policy. Moreover, citizens’ behavior leads to an increase in transfers by the foreign lobby.
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- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
- Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 57.
- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
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