Calculus of Bargaining Solution on Boolean Tables
This article reports an “acceptable calculus” of the bargaining problem solution as used by game theoreticians. By an acceptable calculus we understand an algorithm which can lead us to the result in an acceptable time either using the computing power of nowadays computers or a known classical model, like LaGrange method of function maximization with constraints. Our motive is quite difficult to meet, but we hope to move in this direction in order to close the gap at least for one nontrivial situation on Boolean tables.
Volume (Year): 28 (2001)
Issue (Month): 15 ()
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