Calculus of Bargaining Solution on Boolean Tables
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- Joseph Mullat, 2001. "Stable Coalitions in Monotonic Games," Game Theory and Information 0112003, EconWPA, revised 13 Sep 2005.
- Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Mullat J. E., 1996.
"A fast algorithm for finding matching responses in a survey data table,"
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Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 61-61, February.
- Mullat, Joseph E., 1995. "A fast algorithm for finding matching responses in a survey data table," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 195-205, October.
- Alexander Genkin & Ilya Muchnik, 1993. "Fixed points approach to clustering," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 10(2), pages 219-240, December.
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- Joseph Mullat, 2001. "Three Union Regulations for Environment Protection Agency: A Game with 12 bank notes," Game Theory and Information 0112006, EconWPA, revised 27 Aug 2005.
More about this item
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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