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On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions

  • Shurojit Chatterji


    (School of Economics, Singapore Management University)

  • Remzi Sanver


    (Department of Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University)

  • Arunava Sen


    (Indian Statistical Institute)

In this paper, we investigate domains which admit "well-behaved", strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982). We provide sharper versions of the results above when tops-onlyness is replaced by tops-selectivity and the richness condition is weakened.

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Paper provided by Singapore Management University, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 07-2010.

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Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
Handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:07-2010
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  4. Muller, Eitan, 1982. "Graphs and Anonymous Social Welfare Functions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 609-22, October.
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  15. Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January.
  16. Miguel Angel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2006. "A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 656.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  17. Danilov, Vladimir I., 1994. "The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 123-131, April.
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  19. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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