Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsMajority tyranny; single winner elections; plurality voting rule; plurality with runo ; instant runo voting; mutual majority criterion; voting rules;
- Z - Other Special Topics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2018-07-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2018-07-23 (Economic Design)
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