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Two types of participation failure under nine voting methods in variable electorates


  • Dan S. Felsenthal

    () (University of Haifa)

  • Hannu Nurmi

    () (University of Turku)


Abstract This paper expands the illustration and analysis regarding the susceptibility of nine voting procedures to two types of what are generally known as No-Show paradoxes. Following the article by Felsenthal and Tideman (Theory and Decision 75:59–77, 2013), the two paradoxes are denoted as P-TOP and P-BOT paradoxes. According to the P-TOP paradox it is possible that if candidate x has been elected by a given electorate then, ceteris paribus, another candidate, y, may be elected if additional voters join the electorate who rank x at the top of their preference ordering. Similarly, according to the P-BOT paradox it is possible that if candidate y has not been elected by a given electorate then, ceteris paribus, y may be elected if additional voters join the electorate who rank y at the bottom of their preference ordering. Voting procedures that are susceptible to these paradoxes are considered to be afflicted with a particularly serious defect because instead of encouraging voters to participate in an election and vote according to their true preference orderings, they may inhibit voters from participating in an election and thereby undermine the rationale for conducting elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi, 2016. "Two types of participation failure under nine voting methods in variable electorates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 115-135, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:168:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0352-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0352-5

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Young, H. P., 1977. "Extending Condorcet's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 335-353, December.
    2. Paul B. Simpson, 1969. "On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 478-490.
    3. Dan Felsenthal & Nicolaus Tideman, 2013. "Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 59-77, July.
    4. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
    5. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
    6. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
    7. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015137, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0465-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:spr:grdene:v:27:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-018-9580-z is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Can, Burak & Ergin, Emre & Pourpouneh, Mohsen, 2017. "Condorcet versus participation criterion in social welfare rules," Research Memorandum 020, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    4. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0472-6 is not listed on IDEAS


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