The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
The No Show Paradox (there is a voter who would rather not vote) is known to affect every Condorcet voting function. This paper analyses two strong versions of this paradox in the context of Condorcet voting correspondences. The first says that there is a voter whose favorite candidate loses the election if she votes honestly, but gets elected if she abstains. The second says that there is a voter whose least preferred candidate gets elected if she votes honestly, but loses the election if she abstains. All Condorcet correspondences satisfying some weak domination properties are shown to be affected by these strong forms of the paradox. On the other hand, with the exception of the Simpson-Cramer Minmax and the Young rule, all the Condorcet correspondences that (to the best of our knowledge) are proposed in the literature suffer from these two paradoxes.
Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 30 November 1999/Accepted: 27 March 2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm|
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:601-616. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.