Revisiting The Connection Between The No-Show Paradox And Monotonicity
We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules. Although the literature has established their logical independence , we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would suggest. Our analysis is made both under variable and fixed-size electorates.
|Date of creation:||18 Feb 2016|
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