One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
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Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Orhan Erdem & M. Sanver, 2005. "Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 31-42, October.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter, 1998.
98-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089 Elsevier.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236 Elsevier.
- Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Saari, Donald G., 1999. "Explaining All Three-Alternative Voting Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 313-355, August.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006.
"Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules,"
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
- Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2002. "Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 513-515.
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