Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem
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- Saran Rene & Tumennasan Norovsambuu, 2011. "Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem," Research Memorandum 019, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsNash Implementation; Political Process; p-Implementation; Direct Democracy; Oligarchy; Oligarchic Democracy; Random Sampling;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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