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Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy

  • Ashraf-Ball, Hezlin
  • Oswald, Andrew J.

    (Department of Economics, Warwick University)

  • Oswald, James I.

Unlike oil and coal, which are compressed forms of energy, renewable energy requires unusually large land areas. This article calculates the consequences of a switch to hydrogen-cell vehicles powered by electricity from wind turbines. It then re-does the calculation for three other green energy sources : wave power ; biofuels ; solar energy. We argue that policy-makers and social scientists need to understand the significant spatial demands of a move to a carbon-free society.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2009/twerp_903.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 903.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:903
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  1. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Discussion Papers 1332, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  3. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2010. "Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 775-785, September.
  4. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1987. "On constant maskin monotonic social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 382-386, August.
  5. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  6. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  8. BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 2005072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Marion Oury & Olivier Tercieux, 2009. "Continuous Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0090, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  10. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
  11. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
  12. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
  13. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
  14. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
  15. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 121-128.
  16. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
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