Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules
No abstract is available for this item.
Volume (Year): 26 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lepelley, Dominique & Valognes, Fabrice, 2003.
"Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity,"
Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 165-184, July.
- Dominique Lepelley & Fabrice Valognes, 2003. "Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity," Post-Print halshs-00069239, HAL.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais, 2002. "Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation," Post-Print halshs-00069522, HAL.
- Donald G. Saari, 2003. "Unsettling aspects of voting theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 529-555, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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