On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
In voting theory, analyzing the frequency of an event (e.g. a voting paradox), under some specific but widely used assumptions, is equivalent to computing the exact number of integer solutions in a system of linear constraints. Recently, some algorithms for computing this number have been proposed in social choice literature by Huang and Chua (Soc Choice Welfare 17:143–155 2000) and by Gehrlein (Soc Choice Welfare 19:503–512 2002; Rev Econ Des 9:317–336 2006). The purpose of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we want to do justice to Eugène Ehrhart, who, more than forty years ago, discovered the theoretical foundations of the above mentioned algorithms. Secondly, we present some efficient algorithms that have been recently developed by computer scientists, independently from voting theorists. Thirdly, we illustrate the use of these algorithms by providing some original results in voting theory.
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Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
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- William Gehrlein, 2004. "Consistency in Measures of Social Homogeneity: A Connection with Proximity to Single Peaked Preferences," Quality & Quantity- International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 147-171, April.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006.
"Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Post-Print halshs-00068839, HAL.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais, 2002. "original papers : Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 213-228.
- William V. Gehrlein, 2002. "Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 503-512.
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