On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0236-1
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Other versions of this item:
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2007. "On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory," Post-Print hal-01245310, HAL.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006. "On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200610, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
References listed on IDEAS
- William V. Gehrlein, 2002. "Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 503-512.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais, 2002. "original papers : Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 213-228.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006.
"Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Post-Print halshs-00068839, HAL.
- William Gehrlein, 2004. "Consistency in Measures of Social Homogeneity: A Connection with Proximity to Single Peaked Preferences," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 147-171, April.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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