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Decision Rules for the Academy Awards Versus Those for Elections


  • William V. Gehrlein

    () (Department of Business Administration, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716-2710)

  • Hemant V. Kher

    () (Department of Business Administration, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716-2710)


Many researchers have evaluated various decision rules to determine how well they perform in selecting winners in elections. They have established criteria to measure how well these rules perform in selecting winners with the greatest mass appeal in general elections. We evaluate such decision rules on their performance in determining winners of awards for outstanding accomplishment. We examined the procedures the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences uses to choose nominees and winners for Academy Awards. We chose this example for two reasons. First, the academy uses several decision rules to select nominees and to select the winners from the lists of final nominees. Second, Academy Awards have an enormous impact on earnings and careers. We found that decision rules that can have negative effects in elections based on mass appeal can have positive aspects in determining winners of awards for outstanding accomplishment.

Suggested Citation

  • William V. Gehrlein & Hemant V. Kher, 2004. "Decision Rules for the Academy Awards Versus Those for Elections," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 34(3), pages 226-234, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:orinte:v:34:y:2004:i:3:p:226-234

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais, 2002. "original papers : Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 213-228.
    2. Saari, Donald G., 1989. "A dictionary for voting paradoxes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 443-475, August.
    3. Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais, 2002. "Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation," Post-Print halshs-00069522, HAL.
    4. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    6. Coggins, Jay S & Perali, C Federico, 1998. "Sixty-Four Percent Majority Rule in Ducal Venice: Voting for the Doge," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 709-723, December.
    7. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2000. "The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 191-197, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Iain Pardoe & Dean K. Simonton, 2008. "Applying discrete choice models to predict Academy Award winners," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 171(2), pages 375-394.

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    games; group decisions; voting; committees;


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