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Consensus in the 2015 Provincial Parliament Election in Styria, Austria: Voting Rules,Outcomes, and the Condorcet Paradox

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Darmann

    (University of Graz, Austria)

  • Julia Grundner

    (University of Graz, Austria)

  • Christian Klamler

    (University of Graz, Austria)

Abstract

Theoretical differences between different voting rules have been well-studied, and several paradoxical situations are known. For instance, the use of different voting rules not only can lead to different winners for the same preference profile, but also might the winner under one voting rule be the loser under another voting rule. Also, cyclic collective preferences – as in Condorcet cycles – can make it impossible to determine the winner of an election under a specific voting rule in use. Based on data collected in an online-survey in connection with the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria, we provide an empirical analysis of whether different voting rules yield different outcomes in real-world elections, and whether paradoxical situations show up in real-world data. For our findings, we generate statistical confidence levels by the use of a nonparametric bootstrap.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Darmann & Julia Grundner & Christian Klamler, 2017. "Consensus in the 2015 Provincial Parliament Election in Styria, Austria: Voting Rules,Outcomes, and the Condorcet Paradox," Graz Economics Papers 2017-13, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2017-13
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Election; Voting rules; Empirical study; Condorcet;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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