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Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Darmann

    (University of Graz)

  • Julia Grundner

    (University of Graz)

  • Christian Klamler

    (University of Graz)

Abstract

We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally, we provide a categorization of different types of parties and analyze the impact of certain voting rules (Plurality Rule, Plurality Run Off, Hare System, Condorcet Method, Approval Voting, Borda Rule, Evaluative Voting, and Majority Judgment) on the performances of parties in those scenarios.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Darmann & Julia Grundner & Christian Klamler, 2017. "Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 201-216, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0472-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0472-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Darmann, Andreas & Grundner, Julia & Klamler, Christian, 2019. "Evaluative voting or classical voting rules: Does it make a difference? Empirical evidence for consensus among voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 345-353.
    2. Andreas Darmann & Julia Grundner & Christian Klamler, 2017. "Consensus in the 2015 Provincial Parliament Election in Styria, Austria: Voting Rules,Outcomes, and the Condorcet Paradox," Graz Economics Papers 2017-13, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    3. Andreas Darmann & Christian Klamler, 2023. "Does the rule matter? A comparison of preference elicitation methods and voting rules based on data from an Austrian regional parliamentary election in 2019," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 63-87, October.
    4. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon, 2021. "Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 803-834, May.
    5. Annick Laruelle, 2021. "“Not This One”: Experimental Use of the Approval and Disapproval Ballot," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 15-28, December.
    6. Laruelle, Annick, 2018. "Voting and expressing dissatisfaction: an experiment during the 2017 French Presidential election," IKERLANAK 25736, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    7. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon, 2020. "Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting," Working Papers halshs-02926780, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Election; Voting rules; Types of parties; Empirical study;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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