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Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election

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  • Steven Brams
  • Michael Hansen
  • Michael Orrison

Abstract

In 2006, the Public Choice Society chose a new president using approval voting. There were five candidates, and the election was extremely close. We indicate the sources of support of the different candidates, based in part on spectral analysis, by voters who cast between one and five votes. Using preference information that was also gathered, we show that two candidates different from the approval voting winner, including the apparent Condorcet winner, might have won under different voting systems. Because most voters did not indicate their complete preference rankings, however, these differences are hardly robust, especially since the outcome was essentially a dead heat. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Brams & Michael Hansen & Michael Orrison, 2006. "Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 361-366, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:3:p:361-366
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9060-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37, Springer.
    2. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163.
    3. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046.
    4. Richard F. Potthoff & Steven J. Brams, 1998. "Proportional Representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 147-178, April.
    5. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236, Elsevier.
    6. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
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    Cited by:

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    2. J. C. R. Alcantud & R. Andrés Calle & J. M. Cascón, 2015. "Pairwise Dichotomous Cohesiveness Measures," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(5), pages 833-854, September.
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    4. Onur Doğan & Ayça Giritligil, 2014. "Implementing the Borda outcome via truncated scoring rules: a computational study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 83-98, April.
    5. Andreas Darmann & Julia Grundner & Christian Klamler, 2017. "Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 201-216, October.

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