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Single vote multiple seats elections. Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands

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  • Colignatus, Thomas

Abstract

No new issues are discussed but we try to improve on the didactics of some well-known elementary features of multiple seats elections that rely on a single vote such as common elections for Parliament or the U.S. Congress. The didactics concentrate on proportionality versus districts. Since some people in the UK want more proportionality and some people in Holland want more districts, the examples of the UK 2010 and Dutch 2006 general elections are developed in some detail. Subordinate issues are (1) majority versus plurality, and (2) threshold methods versus the mechanisms of highest average, greatest remainder and the principle of Sainte-Laguë & Webster. The latter can be optimal for apportionment of states or districts that will get at least one seat. That kind of optimality can be dubious for political parties. Firstly because a party with a majority in the turnout may miss out on majority in Parliament and secondly since voters for some party A may not want that their vote, if wasted, goes to some party B. A proportional representation of the wasted vote w in total n is also possible by leaving seats empty or by filling the seats and taking a qualified majority f = 1/2 * n / (n - w). We thus should distinguish the mirroring of the proportions in the vote and the mirroring of a majority (and it is not quite true that the first takes care of the latter). For a coalition formed after the elections there is the more complex threshold of a "coalition qualified majority" since the coalition may not always be a solid block. A compromise of proportionality and districts is to allow free (non-district) seats for the overflow. E.g. if half of the seats in Parliament are for single seat districts then the district size can be twice the electoral quota and a district candidate is (ideally) elected when gaining a majority of at least one quota. An algorithm is given that includes such rules and some simulations are shown. A multiple seats election is not quite the same as a series of single seat elections. Direct single seat elections such as for the chief executive (President) are riddled with voting paradoxes. Superior to a single vote are some methods with preference orderings like the Borda Fixed Point but these are somewhat complex. Optimal seems the indirect method where the electorate chooses Parliament in a single vote multiple seats election and that Parliament then applies the complexer preference methods for the single seat election of the Premier. For example, though voters only gave a single vote, David Cameron would be the Borda Fixed Point winner, second to Nick Clegg in a Borda count but still winning in a pairwise vote. It is also explained how to use some new routines in Mathematica.

Suggested Citation

  • Colignatus, Thomas, 2010. "Single vote multiple seats elections. Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands," MPRA Paper 22671, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Jul 2007.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22671
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Colignatus, Thomas, 2007. "In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections," MPRA Paper 3170, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163.
    3. Colignatus, Thomas, 2007. "Why one would accept Voting Theory for Democracy and reject the Penrose Square Root Weights," MPRA Paper 3885, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Jul 2007.
    4. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, March.
    5. Colignatus, Thomas, 2008. "Review of Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", with a reaction, also on its relevance in 2008 for the European Union," MPRA Paper 9661, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Jul 2008.
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    1. Colignatus, Thomas, 2017. "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of March 2017," MPRA Paper 77616, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2017.
    2. Colignatus, Thomas, 2010. "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of June 2010," MPRA Paper 23240, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 May 2010.
    3. Colignatus, Thomas, 2017. "One woman, one vote. Though not in the USA, UK and France," MPRA Paper 82513, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Nov 2017.
    4. Colignatus, Thomas, 2017. "Comparing votes and seats with a diagonal (dis-) proportionality measure, using the slope-diagonal deviation (SDD) with cosine, sine and sign," MPRA Paper 80833, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Aug 2017.
    5. Colignatus, Thomas, 2013. "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of September 2012," MPRA Paper 44158, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Feb 2013.
    6. Colignatus, Thomas, 2017. "Two conditions for the application of Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient to voting and allocated seats," MPRA Paper 80297, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Jul 2017.
    7. Colignatus, Thomas, 2018. "An overview of the elementary statistics of correlation, R-squared, cosine, sine, and regression through the origin, with application to votes and seats for Parliament," MPRA Paper 84722, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Feb 2018.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; political science; public choice; optimal representation; electoral systems; elections; voting; district; proportional representation; electoral quota; majority; pure threshold; qualified majority; greatest remainder; highest average; Webster; Sainte-Laguë; apportionment; wasted vote; multiple seats; single seat; empty seat; free seat; additional-members system; mixed proportionality; political party; party list; coalition;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C88 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Other Computer Software
    • A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics

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