"Approval Voting" lacks a sound moral base for the individual voter's choice of approval versus non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected
"Approval Voting" is the voting mechanism reportedly used since 1987 by professional and scientific societies such as the Econometric Society, INFORMS, ASA, AMS, MAA, IEEE and the Social Choice and Welfare Society. The method lacks a sound moral base for the choice by individual members between approval and non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected. Minority rights are better protected when every voter respects the uniform Status Quo, rather than allowing that every voter determines a private (secret) reference point. A better method than Approval Voting is the (Pareto-) Borda Fixed Point rule introduced in the literature in 2001.
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