Review of Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", with a reaction, also on its relevance in 2008 for the European Union
There will be many researchers who discover voting theory afresh and who will want to understand it and its interesting paradoxes. Arrow's theorem (1951, 1963) is the most celebrated result in social choice theory. It has been criticized a lot but Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", is a monograph that actually succeeds. The booklet has received insufficient attention in the literature. This review also compares DeLong’s approach with my own book "Voting theory for democracy" (2007) and comments on the relevance in 2008 for the European Union, with respect to the veto power of its Member States and their citizens.
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|Date of revision:||21 Jul 2008|
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- Deirdre McCloskey, 2004. "The Bourgeois Virtues," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 5(3), pages 1-16, July.
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