In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections
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References listed on IDEAS
- Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163, October.
- Wilson, James Q., 1993. "The Moral Sense," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 1-11, March.
- Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477.
- Thomas Colignatus, 2005. "Announcement of availability: "Definition & Reality in the General Theory of Political Economy" 2nd edition 2005," General Economics and Teaching 0502072, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Thomas Cool, 2000. "Aspects of testing (matching, ranking and rating)," General Economics and Teaching 0004004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jul 2000.
- Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, October.
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Cited by:
- Colignatus, Thomas, 2007. "Why one would accept Voting Theory for Democracy and reject the Penrose Square Root Weights," MPRA Paper 3885, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Jul 2007.
- Colignatus, Thomas, 2010. "Single vote multiple seats elections. Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands," MPRA Paper 22671, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Jul 2007.
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More about this item
Keywords
voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; run-off plurality; Borda Fixed Point; democracy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2007-05-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2007-05-19 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2007-05-19 (Positive Political Economics)
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