Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion'
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- Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 25-28, June.
References listed on IDEAS
- Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-1306, September.
- Donald Saari & Anne Petron, 2006. "Negative externalities and Sen’s liberalism theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 265-281, June.
- Nitzan,Shmuel, 2009. "Collective Preference and Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521722131, April.
- Graciela Chichilnisky, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(2), pages 337-352.
- Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051, April.
- Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607, April.
- Lerer, Ehud & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1985. "Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 191-201, October.
- Shmuel Nitzan, 1989. "More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 187-190.
More about this item
Keywordssocial choice; impossibility theorems; metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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