IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/biu/wpaper/2009-18.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion'

Author

Listed:
  • Shmuel Nitzan

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.

Suggested Citation

  • Shmuel Nitzan, 2009. "Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion'," Working Papers 2009-18, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-18
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www2.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2009-18.pdf
    File Function: Working paper
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163.
    2. Nitzan,Shmuel, 2009. "Collective Preference and Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521897259.
    3. Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-1306, September.
    4. Lerer, Ehud & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1985. "Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 191-201, October.
    5. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051.
    6. Donald Saari & Anne Petron, 2006. "Negative externalities and Sen’s liberalism theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 265-281, June.
    7. Graciela Chichilnisky, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 337-352.
    8. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607.
    9. Shmuel Nitzan, 1989. "More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(1), pages 187-190.
    10. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Piggins, Ashley & Salerno, Gillian, 2016. "Sen cycles and externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 25-27.
    2. Muhammad Mahajne & Shmuel Nitzan & Oscar Volij, 2013. "LEVEL r CONSENSUS AND STABLE SOCIAL CHOICE," Working Papers 1305, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    3. Lingfang (Ivy) Li & Donald Saari, 2008. "Sen’s theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 393-413, October.
    4. Muhammad Mahajne & Shmuel Nitzan & Oscar Volij, 2015. "Level $$r$$ r consensus and stable social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 805-817, December.
    5. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins & William Zwicker, 2016. "Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 301-333, February.
    6. Peter Emerson, 2013. "The original Borda count and partial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 353-358, February.
    7. Donald G. Saari, 2019. "Arrow, and unexpected consequences of his theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 133-144, April.
    8. Manzoor Ahmad Zahid & Harrie de Swart, 2015. "Experimental Results about Linguistic Voting," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 184-201, December.
    9. Donald Saari, 2011. "Source of complexity in the social and managerial sciences: an extended Sen’s theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 609-620, October.
    10. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2022. "The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 427-447, October.
    11. Aki Lehtinen, 2011. "A welfarist critique of social choice theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 359-381, July.
    12. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2016. "Is majority consistency possible?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 287-299, February.
    13. Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Arkadii Slinko, 2015. "Distance rationalization of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 345-377, September.
    14. Herrade Igersheim, 2013. "Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 463-477, April.
    15. Wu-Hsiung Huang, 2014. "Singularity and Arrow’s paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 671-706, March.
    16. Luc Lauwers, 2009. "The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 449-476, September.
    17. Terzopoulou, Zoi & Endriss, Ulle, 2021. "The Borda class," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 31-40.
    18. Bhattacharya, Mihir & Gravel, Nicolas, 2021. "Is the preference of the majority representative ?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 87-94.
    19. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
    20. Lauwers, Luc, 2000. "Topological social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-39, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    social choice; impossibility theorems; metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Department of Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/debaril.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.