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Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules

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  • Lerer, Ehud
  • Nitzan, Shmuel

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  • Lerer, Ehud & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1985. "Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 191-201, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:37:y:1985:i:1:p:191-201
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    Cited by:

    1. Andjiga, Nicolas G. & Mekuko, Aurelien Y. & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2014. "Metric rationalization of social welfare functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 14-23.
    2. Muhammad Mahajne & Shmuel Nitzan & Oscar Volij, 2015. "Level $$r$$ r consensus and stable social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 805-817, December.
    3. repec:spr:grdene:v:27:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-017-9553-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Muhammad Mahajne & Shmuel Nitzan & Oscar Volij, 2013. "LEVEL r CONSENSUS AND STABLE SOCIAL CHOICE," Working Papers 1305, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    5. Bednay, Dezsö & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2016. "Searching for the ‘least’ and ‘most’ dictatorial rules," Working Papers 2072/261532, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    6. repec:spr:grdene:v:22:y:2013:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-011-9271-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 25-28, June.
    8. Eyal Baharad & Leif Danziger, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6851, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," IZA Discussion Papers 11287, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2016. "Is majority consistency possible?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 287-299, February.
    11. Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Arkadii Slinko, 2015. "Distance rationalization of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 345-377, September.
    12. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," GLO Discussion Paper Series 185, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    13. Christian Roessler, 2006. "Public Good Menus and Feature Complementarity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 962, The University of Melbourne.

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