Power, Outcomes and Preferences / Macht, Ereignisse und Präferenzen
There is an ongoing discussion about the relationship of power and preferences: Is power reflected in what the agents can do and what they want to do, or, alternatively, are preferences and power two separate dimensions of determining the outcome of decisionmaking? In the latter case decisionmaking is troubled with all kinds of paradoxes which do not allow to derive well-defined outcomes which can relate preferences to resources (votes), decision rules, and power – if we do not subscribe to the rather rigorous assumption of single-peaked preferences on a one-dimensional preference space. This paper raises the question whether these paradoxes do not undermine a power concept which combines preferences and collective decision rules, described by games, with resulting outcomes. A discussion of the Public Good Index with respect to decision rules concludes the paper.
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Volume (Year): 225 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
- Brams, Steven J., 1994.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089
- Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163, September.
- Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
- Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, September.
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