On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation
This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, first and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can influence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election.
|Date of creation:||2006|
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- Iannantuoni, Giovanna & De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2002. "Some results on strategic voting and proportional representation with multidimensional policy space," UC3M Working papers. Economics we025721, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007.
"A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 2000. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2000037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236 Elsevier.
- Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089 Elsevier.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter, 1998. "Voting Procedures," Working Papers 98-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Cox, Gary W & Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 1996. "Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 299-324, October.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
- Iannantuoni, Giovanna & De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2005. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," UC3M Working papers. Economics we053421, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005. "Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0531, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. "Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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