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Some results on strategic voting and proportional representation with multidimensional policy space

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  • De Sinopoli, Francesco
  • Iannantuoni, Giovanna

Abstract

We study a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. We first show, via an example, that the assumption of quasi-concavity of the utility function is not sufficient to obtain the result that only the extreme parties get votes, contrary to the unidimensional case. We, then, study two cases in which stronger assumptions on voters' preferences assure that voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

Suggested Citation

  • De Sinopoli, Francesco & Iannantuoni, Giovanna, 2002. "Some results on strategic voting and proportional representation with multidimensional policy space," UC3M Working papers. Economics we025721, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we025721
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    1. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
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    1. SLINKO, Arkadii & WHITE, Shaun, 2006. "On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation," Cahiers de recherche 2006-20, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    2. SLINKO, Arkadii & WHITE, Shaun, 2006. "On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation," Cahiers de recherche 12-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

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