Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation
In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium, if the electorate is large. Moreover, we show that there is an effect of sincere voters' behavior on the equilibrium outcome, for which strategic voters cannot fully adjust.
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- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007.
"A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 2000. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2000037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
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