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Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case

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  • Francesco Sinopoli

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  • Giovanna Iannantuoni

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Abstract

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
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Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:401-417
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0238-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
    2. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
    3. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:02:p:405-422_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(02), pages 405-422, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. SLINKO, Arkadii & WHITE, Shaun, 2006. "On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation," Cahiers de recherche 2006-20, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    2. Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 879-903, December.
    3. SLINKO, Arkadii & WHITE, Shaun, 2006. "On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation," Cahiers de recherche 12-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    4. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2013. "Voting for Legislators," Working Papers 240, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2013.
    5. Stephen Ansolabehere & M. Socorro Puy, 2015. "Ideology, Nationalism, and Identity in Basque Regional Elections," Working Papers 2015-02, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    6. Stephen Ansolabehere & M. Socorro Puy, 2016. "Identity voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 77-95, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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