Voting for Legislators
In this paper we propose a model with uncertainty in which strategic voters vote, under poportional rule, for a Parliament and parties bargain to form a government. We prove that only consensus government form and only extreme parties take votes.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2013|
|Date of revision:||Mar 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +39 02 6448 3089
Fax: +39 02 6448 3085
Web page: http://dems.unimib.it
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005.
"Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0531, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "Extreme Voting Under Proportional Representation:The Multidimensional Case," Economics Working Papers we053421, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007.
"A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 2000. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2000037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004.
"An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999. "An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures," Discussion Papers 1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:240. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Matteo Pelagatti)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.