Voting for Legislators
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References listed on IDEAS
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007.
"A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria,"
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- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
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More about this item
KeywordsProportional Election; Strategic Voting; Legislative Bargaining;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-03-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-03-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-03-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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