Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?
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- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2011. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 311-327, June.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2008. "Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences," MPRA Paper 12610, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2009.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Felix Arnold, 2013. "German MPs' Outside Jobs and Their Repercussions on Parliamentary Effort," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1340, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2014. "The law of large districts: How district magnitude affects the quality of political representation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 128-140.
More about this item
KeywordsElectoral systems; proportional rule; plurality rule; voters’ representation;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-01-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-01-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2010-01-10 (Positive Political Economics)
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