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Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective

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  • Laurent, Thibault
  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Lepelley, Dominique
  • de Mouzon, Olivier

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning of the Electoral College. The two versions of interstate Compact which are considered here differ in only one respect: in one case the interstate compact allocates its electoral votes to the regional popular winner while in the other case it allocates these votes to the national popular winner. They both differ from the ongoing National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as it is assumed that the agreement is effective as soon as the members sign it. The decisiveness and welfare analysis are conducted for a simplified symmetric theoretical version of the Electoral College where the malapportionment problems are absent. The three most popular probabilistic models are considered and the study is conducted either from the self-interest perspective of the initiators of the interstate compact or from a general interest perspective. The analysis combines analytical arguments and simulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier, 2017. "Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective," TSE Working Papers 17-861, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:32194
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann, 2010. "Welfarist evaluations of decision rules under interstate utility dependencies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 315-344, February.
    2. Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2004. "The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 227-257, January.
    3. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion And Case Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2014. "Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 65(3), pages 469-518.
    5. Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens, 2008. "A power measure analysis of Amendment 36 in Colorado," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 231-246, March.
    6. Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier, 2016. "The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System," TSE Working Papers 16-671, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Feb 2018.
    7. Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2007. "On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(2), pages 181-207, February.
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    9. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2016. "Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 11-22.
    10. Lepelley, Dominique & Merlin, Vincent & Rouet, Jean-Louis, 2011. "Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 28-33, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral College; Voting Power;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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