On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members
Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting gamehave on a binary issue independent opinions, they may haveinterest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gainof influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usualindependence of votes, we first study the alliance voting powerand obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for whichthe number of players is large enough and the alliance weightremains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, wepropose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a randomgame which allows new possibilities. The validity of theasymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examinedby considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers ofthe European Union.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 28, 2, 181--207|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00010168/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
- Guillermo Owen, 1972. "Multilinear Extensions of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 64-79, January.
- Dennis Leech, 2003. "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(6), pages 831-837, June.
- Lindner, Ines & Machover, Moshe, 2004. "L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 37-49, January.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2002. "Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 295-312, April.
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