A model of influence in a social network
In the paper, we study a model of influence in a social network. It is assumed that each player has an inclination to say YES or NO which, due to influence of other players, may be different from the decision of the player. The point of departure here is the concept of the Hoede-Bakker index - the notion which computes the overall decisional "power" of a player in a social network. The main drawback of the Hoede-Bakker index is that it hides the actual role of the influence function, analyzing only the final decision in terms of success and failure. In this paper, we separate the influence part from the group decision part, and focus on the description and analysis of the influence part. We propose among other descriptive tools a definition of a (weighted) influence index of a coalition upon an individual. Moreover, we consider different influence functions representative of commonly encountered situations. Finally, we propose a suitable definition of a modified decisional power.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2008.66 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2008|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00344457|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2002. "Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 295-312.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007.
"The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index,"
- (*), Gerard van der Laan & RenÊ van den Brink, 1998. "Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 567-582.
- Michel Grabisch & Fabien Lange, 2007.
"Games on lattices, multichoice games and the shapley value: a new approach,"
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research,
Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 65(1), pages 153-167, February.
- Michel Grabisch & Fabien Lange, 2007. "Games on lattices, multichoice games and the Shapley value: a new approach," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00178916, HAL.
- René Brink & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Guillermo Owen, 2008. "Characterizations of the β- and the Degree Network Power Measure," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(4), pages 519-536, June.
- R J Johnston, 1978.
"On the Measurement of Power: Some Reactions to Laver,"
Environment and Planning A,
SAGE Publishing, vol. 10(8), pages 907-914, August.
- R J Johnston, 1978. "On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 10(8), pages 907-914, August.
- Hu, Xingwei & Shapley, Lloyd S., 2003. "On authority distributions in organizations: equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 132-152, October.
- Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2002.
"A Banzhaf share function for cooperative games in coalition structure,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 61-86, August.
- van der Laan, G. & van den Brink, J.R., 1998. "A Banzhaf share function for cooperative games in coalition structure," Discussion Paper 1998-66, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- M.R. Feix & D. Lepelley & V. Merlin & J.L. Rouet, 2006.
"On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members,"
Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen)
200605, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2007. "On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(2), pages 181-207, February.
- Vincent Merlin & Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2007. "On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members," Post-Print halshs-00010168, HAL.
- van den Brink, J.R. & Borm, P.E.M., 2002.
"Digraph competitions and cooperative games,"
Other publications TiSEM
262e8724-0bc0-49da-99c5-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover & William Zwicker, 1998. "The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 83-116, January.
- Annick Laruelle & F. Valenciano, 2005.
"Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations,"
- Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
- Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 1998. "Axiomatization of a class of share functions for n-person games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 117-148, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00344457. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.