Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)
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- Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens, 2008. "A power measure analysis of Amendment 36 in Colorado," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 231-246, March.
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- Patrick Hummel, 2011. "Proportional versus winner-take-all electoral vote allocations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 381-393, September.
- Vincent Merlin & Jean-Lous Rouet & Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley, 2004.
"The Probability of Conflicts in a U.S. Presidential Type Election,"
- Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2004. "The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 227-257, January.
- Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & M. Feix & J.-L. Rouet, 2004. "The Probability of Conflicts in a US Presidential Type Election," Post-Print halshs-00070893, HAL.
- Leech, Dennis, 2010. "Power Indices in Large Voting Bodies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 942, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Ingberman, Daniel E & Yao, Dennis A, 1991. "Circumventing Formal Structure through Commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 151-79, May.
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