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Three Bizarre Presidential-Election Scenarios: The Perils of Simplism

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  • Richard F. Potthoff

    (Department of Political Science and Social Science Research Institute, Duke University, Box 90420, Durham, NC 27708, USA)

Abstract

The 1968, 2000, and (future) 2024 U.S. presidential elections provide settings for deliberately provocative, offbeat scenarios that might have happened or could happen. Throughout, the Electoral College and plurality voting both receive blame. Scenario 1 exposes a quirk previously unnoticed: Under (albeit special) conditions, certain 1968 Humphrey voters could have made Humphrey rather than Nixon the election victor had they voted strategically for Wallace instead of Humphrey. In Scenario 2, overlooked nonidentifiability of undervotes would have plagued the 2000 Florida recount had the U.S. Supreme Court not halted it, thus raising questions about the foresightfulness of almost everyone involved; but, in addition, Gore missed an opportunity that, through use of proper statistical sampling, could have propelled him to victory. In Scenario 3, National Popular Vote Interstate Compact supporters fail to foresee that even one state, by changing its method for presidential voting, can wreck this innovative and widely promoted compact.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard F. Potthoff, 2019. "Three Bizarre Presidential-Election Scenarios: The Perils of Simplism," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(5), pages 1-23, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jscscx:v:8:y:2019:i:5:p:134-:d:226941
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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