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Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections

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  • Richard Potthoff

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Abstract

This article focuses on voting systems that (i) aim to select the Condorcet candidate in the common case where one exists and (ii) impede manipulation by exploiting voter knowledge of electorate preferences. The systems are relatively simple, both mathematically and for voter understanding, and are fully workable for large-scale elections. Their designated equilibrium strategies, under which voters vote sincerely, involve discerning the top one or two candidates in the preference ordering of the electorate. One set of systems uses its ballot to obtain voters’ preference rankings plus approval votes, and tallies the latter if no Condorcet winner exists. It offers solid advantages vis-à-vis instant-runoff voting, which uses a kindred ballot and has attracted recent reformers. Another set of systems uses only approval voting, which is examined from a new angle. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Potthoff, 2013. "Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 101-122, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:1:p:101-122
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0589-3
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-011-0589-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:reg:rpubli:259 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-145, April.
    3. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2004. "Prediction Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 107-126, Spring.
    4. Forsythe, Robert & Forrest Nelson & George R. Neumann & Jack Wright, 1992. "Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1142-1161, December.
    5. van Deemen, Adrian M A & Vergunst, Noel P, 1998. "Empirical Evidence of Paradoxes of Voting in Dutch Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 475-490, December.
    6. Richard Potthoff, 2011. "Condorcet Polling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 67-86, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard F. Potthoff, 2014. "Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(4), pages 1-30, October.
    2. Steven Brams & Richard Potthoff, 2015. "The paradox of grading systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 193-210, December.
    3. Richard Potthoff & Michael Munger, 2015. "Condorcet polling can yield serendipitous clues about voter views," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 1-12, October.

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