Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections
This article focuses on voting systems that (i) aim to select the Condorcet candidate in the common case where one exists and (ii) impede manipulation by exploiting voter knowledge of electorate preferences. The systems are relatively simple, both mathematically and for voter understanding, and are fully workable for large-scale elections. Their designated equilibrium strategies, under which voters vote sincerely, involve discerning the top one or two candidates in the preference ordering of the electorate. One set of systems uses its ballot to obtain voters’ preference rankings plus approval votes, and tallies the latter if no Condorcet winner exists. It offers solid advantages vis-à-vis instant-runoff voting, which uses a kindred ballot and has attracted recent reformers. Another set of systems uses only approval voting, which is examined from a new angle. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
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Volume (Year): 40 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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