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Circumventing Formal Structure through Commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control

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  • Ingberman, Daniel E
  • Yao, Dennis A

Abstract

Although the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the Congress and the president ought to provide Congress with agenda power, the president is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship. The authors show that if the president can make "clear-cut" commitments, presidential commitment can counter the dominance heirarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes. Thus, the details of political interactions (in particular, the possibilities for commitment) may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Ingberman, Daniel E & Yao, Dennis A, 1991. "Circumventing Formal Structure through Commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 151-179, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:70:y:1991:i:2:p:151-79
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    Cited by:

    1. Shyh-Fang Ueng, 1999. "The Virtue of Installing Veto Players," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 265-282, October.
    2. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    3. Groseclose, Timothy J. & McCarty, Nolan, 1999. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience," Research Papers 1617, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    4. Nicholas Miller, 2012. "Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 1-25, January.

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