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The Virtue of Installing Veto Players

  • Shyh-Fang Ueng
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1009011629466
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 10 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 3 (October)
    Pages: 265-282

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:10:y:1999:i:3:p:265-282
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866

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    1. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    2. Lui, Francis T., 1986. "A dynamic model of corruption deterrence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 215-236, November.
    3. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
    4. Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
    5. McLean, Richard P, 1991. "Random Order Coalition Structure Values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 109-27.
    6. Levy, Anat & Mclean, Richard P., 1989. "Weighted coalition structure values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 234-249, September.
    7. Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1995. "Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization," Discussion Papers 1134, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Ingberman, Daniel E & Yao, Dennis A, 1991. " Circumventing Formal Structure through Commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 151-79, May.
    9. Peleg, Bezalel, 1980. "A theory of coalition formation in committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 115-134, July.
    10. Schofield, N., 1992. "Political Competition in Multiparty Coalition Governments," Papers 164, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
    11. Rasmusen, Eric & Ramseyer, J Mark, 1994. " Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 305-27, March.
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