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Voting for a coalition government: A game-theoretic view

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  • Vannucci, Stefano

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  • Vannucci, Stefano, 1997. "Voting for a coalition government: A game-theoretic view," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 537-555, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:3:p:537-555
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schofield, N., 1992. "Political Competition in Multiparty Coalition Governments," Papers 164, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
    2. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337, Elsevier.
    3. Peleg, Bezalel, 1980. "A theory of coalition formation in committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 115-134, July.
    4. Baron, David P., 1991. "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(1), pages 137-164, March.
    5. Borm, P. E. M. & Tijs, S. H., 1992. "Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 58-71, January.
    6. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1989. "Coalition Voting," Working Papers 89-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    7. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    8. Laver, Michael & Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1990. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 873-890, September.
    9. Giovanni Sartori, 1994. "Comparative Constitutional Engineering," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-22861-4, December.
    10. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
    11. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1990. "Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 891-906, September.
    12. repec:tiu:tiutis:e52774ec-5d61-41f8-8325-b9cf91b9f6a4 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Guido Ortona, 1999. "A weighted-voting electoral system that performs quite well," POLIS Working Papers 4, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.

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