A weighted-voting electoral system that performs quite well
The paper describes a weighted-voting system for the election of a Parliament. The system is easy to implement, and it dominates plurality, where "dominates" means that it performs better with reference to both representativeness and stability. The system has some other nice properties,namely (a) it offers an easy-to-read evaluation of the loss of representativeness of an electoral system; and (b) it makes it relatively easy to adopt the best system after the vote, i.e. the best system conditional to the choice of electors. Indicators for representativeness and stability are defined. Results are experimental.
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- Vannucci, Stefano, 1997. "Voting for a coalition government: A game-theoretic view," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 537-555, September.
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