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Quality, self-regulation, and competition: the case of insurance

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  • Andersson, Fredrik
  • Skogh, Goran

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  • Andersson, Fredrik & Skogh, Goran, 2003. "Quality, self-regulation, and competition: the case of insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 267-280, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:32:y:2003:i:2:p:267-280
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Zweifel, Peter & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1992. "The Political Economy of Corporatism in Medicine: Self-Regulation or Cartel Management?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 89-108, March.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1989. "Imperfect information in the product market," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 769-847 Elsevier.
    3. Mayer, Colin & Neven, Damien J, 1990. "European Financial Integration: A Framework for Policy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 429, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997. "Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, March.
    6. Gehrig, Thomas & Jost, Peter-J, 1995. "Quacks, Lemons, and Self Regulation: A Welfare Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 309-325, May.
    7. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    8. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    9. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    10. Stanley Baiman & Joel S. Demski, 1980. "Variance Analysis Procedures as Motivational Devices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(8), pages 840-848, August.
    11. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring.
    12. Carl Shapiro, 1982. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 20-35, Spring.
    13. W. Bentley MacLeod, 1987. "Entry, Sunk Costs, and Market Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 20(1), pages 140-151, February.
    14. M B Adams & G D Tower, 1994. "Theories of Regulation: Some Reflections on the Statutory Supervision of Insurance Companies in Anglo-American Countries," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 19(2), pages 156-177, April.
    15. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
    16. Per-Olof Bjuggren & Dan Magnusson & Carl Martin Roos, 1994. "Should a Regulatory Body Control Insurance Policies Ex Ante or Is Ex Post Control More Effective?," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 19(1), pages 37-45, January.
    17. Steven Shavell, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-562.
    18. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    19. Ronald A. Dye, 1986. "Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 339-350, Autumn.
    20. Emons, Winand, 1988. "Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 16-33, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. I. Venkat Appal Raju & S. Ramasubramanian, 2016. "Risk Diversifying Treaty Between Two Companies with Only One in Insurance Business," Sankhya B: The Indian Journal of Statistics, Springer;Indian Statistical Institute, vol. 78(2), pages 183-214, November.

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