Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties
No abstract is available for this item.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www-ceel.economia.unitn.it
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
896, David K. Levine.
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
- Miller, Ross M. & Plott, Charles R., .
"Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets,"
447, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-33, April.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985.
"Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring.
- Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
- Berkowitz, M K & Kotowitz, Y, 1993. "Promotions as Work Incentives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 342-53, July.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,"
367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 483-489.
- Heal, Geoffrey, 1976. "Do Bad Products Drive Out Good?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 499-502, August.
- Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
- Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
- Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1988. "An Intertemporal Model of Warranties," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(1), pages 72-86, February.
- Golosinski, Dorothy & West, Douglas S, 1995. "Double Moral Hazard and Shopping Center Similarity in Canada," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 456-78, October.
- John Kambhu, 1982. "Optimal Product Quality under Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 483-492, Autumn.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr.
- Emons,Winand, 1986.
"On the limitation of warranty duration,"
Discussion Paper Serie A
41, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Davis Douglas D. & Holt Charles A., 1994. "Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 39-53, July.
- Emons, Winand, 1988. "Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 16-33, October.
- Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January.
- Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
- Holt, Charles A & Sherman, Roger, 1990. "Advertising and Product Quality in Posted-Offer Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 39-56, January.
- Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A., 1995. "Limitations of dominance and forward induction: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 391-395, October.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:9901. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marco Tecilla)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.