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Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Maskin, Eric

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 483-489.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:31:y:1987:i:1-2:p:483-489
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    Cited by:

    1. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2011. "Competition and the signaling role of prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 412-425, July.
    2. Giorgio Coricelli & Luigi Luini, 1999. "Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties," CEEL Working Papers 9901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    3. Georg Noldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Decomposable Principal-Agent Problems," Microeconomics 0410004, EconWPA.
    4. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2009. "Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 335-350, November.
    5. Lundtofte, Frederik, 2010. "A note on the pricing of IPOs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 105-107, February.
    6. F. Adriani & LG Deidda, 2006. "The Monopolist's Blues," Working Paper CRENoS 200611, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    7. F. Adriani & LG Deidda, 2004. "Few bad apples or plenty of lemons: which makes it harder to market plums?," Working Paper CRENoS 200413, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

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